# What safety is We don't like things getting taken from us, especially when we need them to fulfill a [purpose](purpose.md). In fact, we dislike things taken from us proportionally to how much we [imagine](imagination.md) that thing will fulfill present *and* [perceived purposes](power.md). We naturally purpose ourselves to [protecting what we have](safety-security.md), but it's not an even distribution. We have limited resources, so we give priority to what we [love](people-love.md) and the [power](power.md) that can protect our things the most. When we have safety right now, and don't have [predictions](imagination.md) that it'll change in the future, we have "peace". APPLICATION: Money is a major source of safety, simply because it's effective at solving most problems. ## Risk Risk can most accurately be rephrased as "the [likelihood](imagination.md) that we could lose [power](power.md)". [Risks are inherent](trust.md) to existing in this life, so people become more careful and decisive as they gain [wisdom](understanding.md). With experience, people only act when they're [certain](understanding-certainty.md). We usually have a [fear](mind-feelings-fear.md) of something specific, but it's rarely [rational](logic.md) or [likely](math.md) (especially with [past trauma](hardship-ptsd.md)), so we'll simply [feel](mind-feelings.md) vaguely uneasy. Even when we use [statistics](math.md) or behave to force an ultimatum, we're only making our feelings more [certain](understanding-certainty.md) with fact-based possibilities. The entire point of *any* security/safety system is from vague [trust](trust.md) issues against possible risks: - Walls, fortresses, and blockades - Locks on doors and switches - Passwords/encryption - Antibiotics - Guard rails and barriers The more [fear](mind-feelings-fear.md) we have of losing something, the harder we'll [work](results.md) to keep it. In that sense, you can see how much people [love](people-love.md) things by where they devote their [budget](money-3_budget.md) and other [forms of power](power-types.md). One easy way to avoid financial risk is to get [insurance](money-insurance.md). By giving up some power in the [form of money](power-types.md), someone can have a [separate organization](groups-large.md) take the risk instead. It's basically paying rent for someone else to take the risk. Generally, when [deciding](people-decisions.md) when you don't know what to [expect](imagination.md), the safest solution is to apply "minimax regret" (minimize the maximum regret you can experience). In other words, make the worst-case scenario as good as possible. ## The image of safety Any security system, of any type, can't 100% stop things. A sufficiently [motivated](purpose.md), [creative](mind-creativity.md), and [talented](humanity.md) person can break through anything made by another person. The *actual* purpose of a security system (and a benevolent [legal system](people-boundaries.md)) is to make the intruders [work](results.md) harder than the reward by requiring them to spend more [power](power.md) to get it than it appears to be worth ("deterrence"). Nobody will outright admit it, but defenders are often trying to direct the attackers' efforts to the defender's neighbors. Most people don't separate the concept, but *appearing* secure is different from *being* secure. The [image](image.md) of security can imply more [power](power.md) than reality, which is why people use "security theater": - Security guards make their rounds to look more intimidating to potential thieves and vandals, even though a hidden camera with a motion sensor does a better job. - Thoroughly searching everyone who gets on an airplane will ensure nobody brings a bomb, but random searches (theoretically) [scare](mind-feelings-fear.md) bombers just as much. APPLICATION: Legitimate security and the [appearance](image.md) of security are completely unrelated, so don't assume the appearance is [reality](reality.md), especially with [leaders](groups-large.md). Thieves and vandals are interested in things they can use to gain [some type of power](power-types.md), so another tactic is for defenders to hide their [power](power.md): - Placing valuable objects in mundane storage spaces. - Hiding valuable items inside inconspicuous objects. - Putting important computer files in unimportant folders. Finally, some [creative](mind-creativity.md) defenders will try to make the intruder waste their time on something unimportant: - Place rocks in a safe and hide the valuables. - Have security guards surround a building with nothing significant inside. The only way to avoid a security breach entirely is to hide the appearance of *anything* valuable, but it requires tremendous [work](results.md) and [creativity](mind-creativity.md) to pull it off correctly: - Make a fortress look like the surrounding landscape. - Name an area something inconspicuous. - Veil the presence of the thing with other elements that are far less threatening or high-profile. ## Safety's risks The trouble with safety is that we can put too much effort into it. Taken far enough, safety can stifle healthy changes that may have otherwise led to a [meaningful](meaning.md) experience or [good life](goodlife.md). [Security](safety-security.md) and safety also come with an immovable cost. No matter what, increasing security sacrifices freedom and accessibility. This is because each layer of verification is both time-consuming and could yield a lockdown against the people who *should* have access ("false-negative"): - A *completely* walled city would only be accessible by skilled wall climbers. That's why cities have historically set gates on each side of the city. - It's near-impossible to crack an incredibly elaborate password, but it's also difficult to remember and has to be safely stored if it's written down. - An elaborate key mechanism is difficult to pick, but the key is difficult to reproduce, especially if it's lost. - In [modern society](technology.md), people probably spend at least 10 minutes a day with [habits](habits.md) that activate and deactivate security measures (passwords, car doors, etc.). So, because of this, most security systems build "back doors" to prevent [human error](humanity.md) from locking the entire system down and losing the [valuable](values.md) thing inside. Most [bad actors](morality-evil.md) become far more aware of this than most people want to admit. Because of our [habitual](habits.md) nature, we often forget *why* the security system is there and will fail to verify that it's a legitimate situation: - Man-in-the-middle attacks involve the person thinking they're accessing a legitimate website (which isn't) to enter their credentials like normal. - In a key-card system, people will be quick to give grace to someone who "forgot" their key-card, especially if they share a [common interest](people-friends.md) (like smoking). Distrust can also be [habit-forming](habits.md). We tend to [identify](identity.md) what we [focus](purpose.md) on, so we can become [obsessive](addiction.md) about protecting things. The cure is to ask *what* we're protecting and how much we're willing to [lose it](mind-feelings-fear.md). It's worth noting that security theater is useful in [large organizations](groups-large.md) to make the members feel safe and [trust](trust.md) their leaders [without any legitimate increase](image-distortion.md) in security. Some of them even promise it in exchange for individuals' [freedoms](people-decisions.md)! Security and freedom are inversely correlated, so something [valuable](values.md) that is also useful will invariably have to be protected by something inconvenient, and will likely still be exposed to risks: - Every country needs a military. - Preserving the freedom of speech requires permitting [hate speech](politics-leftism.md). - [Success requires loss](success-5_persevering.md).